Dan Sabbagh, defence & security editor
Five predictions for the next six months in the war in Ukraine
Six months to the day since the start of the Russian invasion, here is what to expect for the next six months
1. The war will probably run on for a year at least but is essentially deadlocked and its intensity is lessening
Six months of war may have gone by, but neither Ukraine nor Russia are ready to stop fighting, despite the losses they have sustained. Ukraine wants its occupied territories back, and Russia wants to keep inflicting pain not just on its opponent but, by proxy, the west also. The Kremlin believes winter will play to its advantage.
There have been no negotiations between the two sides since evidence emerged of the massacres at Bucha, Irpin and elsewhere in territories occupied by the Russians north of Kyiv. But movement in the frontlines has been minimal since the fall of Lysychansk at the end of June. Both sides are struggling for momentum and increasingly appear combat-exhausted.
2. Ukraine has no means of effective conventional counterattack, while guerrilla raids are an optimistic way to precipitate a Russian collapse
Ukraine would like to retake Kherson, on the west of the Dnieper river, but a senior administration figure admitted in private that “we do not have enough capacity to push them back”. Kyiv has shifted its strategy to mounting long-range missile attacks and daring special forces raids on Russian bases deep behind the frontlines.
The key presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said the aim was to “create chaos within the Russian forces”, but while this will blunt the invader’s effectiveness, it is not likely it will lead to invaders collapsing in on themselves and voluntarily conceding Kherson, as some Ukrainian officials have hoped.
3. Russia still wants to pound its way forward but its attention is likely to be shifting to holding on its gains and annexing Ukraine territory
Russia has no new offensive plan other than to mass artillery, destroy towns and cities and grind its way forward. It does this in part because it is effective, and in part to minimise casualties, having lost, on some western estimates, 15,000 dead so far. It continues to adopt this strategy around Bakhmut in the Donbas but progress is slow, partly because it has had to redeploy some forces to reinforce Kherson.
The Kremlin may not have achieved what it hoped at the beginning of the war, but Russia now holds large swathes of Ukrainian territory in the east and south, and is actively talking about holding annexation referendums. With cooler weather fast approaching, it is likely to focus on consolidating what it has.
4. Winter will precipitate a fresh refugee crisis and create an opportunity for whoever can best prepare
Winter is uppermost in strategic thinking for both sides. Ukraine is already anxious about humanitarian issues because there is no gas heating available for apartment blocks in Donetsk province and other frontline areas. One humanitarian official predicted there would be a fresh wave of migration in the winter, with perhaps as many as 2 million people crossing the border into Poland.
Russians sees winter as an opportunity. Ukraine fears Russia will target its energy grid, making its heating dilemma more acute, and could simply turn off the vast Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station. Moscow also wants to prolong the west’s pain over energy costs and has every incentive to rack up the pressure.
Spring, though, could be the time for a renewed attack – each side will want to replenish and prepare for what is likely to be another fighting season.
5. The west needs to decide if it wants Ukraine to win or just hold on – and it needs to match humanitarian help to the huge need
Ukraine would have been defeated without western military aid. But at no point so far has the west supplied enough artillery or other weapons, such as fighter jets, that would allow Kyiv to drive the invaders back. Politicians talk about the need to force Russia to the prewar borders but do not provide enough materiel to do it.
At the same time, Ukraine’s humanitarian need is growing. There is, for example, nowhere near enough money for reconstruction – and many homes north-east and north-west of Kyiv remain ruined five months after the Russians left, often with despairing residents living in garages or temporary structures on site.
People who are displaced internally often have to live in schools or kindergartens, temporary accommodation that people struggle to stay in for an extended period of time. Ukraine has a budget gap of $5bn (£4.2bn) a month because of the war; aid and reconstruction will cost many times that.
Excerpts from the Daily report on the war by the independent Institute for the Study of War:
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 24
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated on August 24 that Russian forces are slowing down the overall pace of their offensive operations in Ukraine while reaffirming that Russia’s objectives in the war have not changed.
At a meeting with defense ministers from member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Shoigu stated that Russian troops will be slowing down the pace of offensive operations in Ukraine in a conscious effort to minimize civilian casualties.[1] Shoigu also reiterated that operations in Ukraine are going according to plan and that Russian forces will accomplish all their objectives, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia’s maximalist strategic war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[2] The Russian MoD has previously issued similar statements to account for the pace of operations in Ukraine.
Shoigu’s statement may also represent an attempt by the Russian MoD to set information conditions to explain and excuse the negligible gains Russian forces have made in Ukraine in the last six weeks. . . .
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian federal subjects (regions) continued to form new volunteer units to reinforce Russia’s war in Ukraine. Altai Krai announced the formation of five volunteer units: the “Kalashnikov” and “Altai” battalions, the “Skurlatova” and “Katun” companies, and the “Biya” platoon. Local outlets did not specify if Altai Krai will be offering one-time enlistment bonuses but noted advertised monthly salary ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 rubles (about $500 to $5,000).[32]
The Republic of Tatarstan local outlet Biznes Online stated that Russian authorities’ classification of such volunteer formations as “battalions” exaggerates the actual number of recruits in each volunteer unit.[33] The outlet noted that Perm Krai’s ”Parma” Battalion has 90 people and is structurally more consistent with a motorized rifle company.[34] The outlet noted that Russia did not previously have territory-based volunteer units as was common in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014 and that Russian forces may be modeling these units after DNR and LNR proxy units, such as the ”Vostok” and ”Somali” battalions.
Battalion personnel complements range in size in any military based on the specialization of the battalion, but the Russian volunteer units’ advertised complements are low, and reported fill levels are even lower. Most “battalions” (and even some “regiments”) will more likely have the size of reinforced companies. It is also noteworthy that these ad hoc volunteer battalions are not described as battalion tactical groups (BTGs) and do not appear to be structured like BTGs. It is not clear how they are being employed on the battlefield unless they are being assembled with one another or with the remnants of already deployed BTGs.
It is clear that a volunteer “battalion” has nothing like the notional combat power of a battalion tactical group that invaded Ukraine in February, even discounting the inexperience and ages of many volunteers and the very limited training they receive before deploying to combat.
Biznes Online also indicated that recruitment into volunteer units decreased throughout the summer and that local Russian officials are intensifying advertising efforts in certain regions. The outlet claimed that the Republic of Tatarstan had only 10-15 interested recruits at the beginning of the recruitment campaign in early June, and such numbers reportedly tripled by the end of the campaign. The outlet’s report confirmed ISW’s assessment that federal subjects began increasing one-time enlistment bonuses to increase recruitment rates in August.[35]
The outlet added that Russian federal subjects also began advertising military contracts in public transportation and other recruitment campaigns ”behind the scenes,” but noted that the Kremlin-sponsored sources have not shared such advertisements.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to shield Moscow City residents from the military recruitment campaign, which may lead to some social tensions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied any reports of the formation of the Moscow-based “Sobyaninsky Polk” volunteer regiment on July 13, shortly after Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Moscow City military commissariats started recruiting labor migrants and residents of different Russian regions into the regiment.[36]
Biznes Online noted that all media discourse regarding the “Sobyaninsky Polk” stopped following Peskov’s denial. The sudden change in reporting may suggest that Moscow City ceased recruitment for the “Sobyaninsky Polk” in an effort to avoid drawing Muscovite criticism of the recruitment campaign. The apparent lack of a Moscow City-based volunteer unit may also spark some criticism from other federal republics. . ..
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces have lost an area larger than Denmark since the high-water mark of their invasion of Ukraine in mid-March and gained an area the size of Andorra (one percent of what they have lost) in the last 39 days.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reaffirmed that Russia has not changed its maximalist strategic war aims.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and west and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to face partisan and internal challenges to the administration of occupation agendas.
- Russian proxy leadership is continuing efforts to oversee the legislative and administrative integration of occupied territories into Russian systems.
Thanks again, Chuck. I would be very interested in similarly detailed analyses of the US’s war aims. How much pressure did Joe Biden put on Volodymyr Zelenskyy to agree a truce at the time of the negotiations about grain shipments from Odesa? A stalemate on the Black Sea would keep Russian forces away from the NATO Baltic States for a while longer.